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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, ; 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
DAVID FAVAZZO, ; 
Defendant / Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 20010831-CA 
) Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's Motion to Suppress? 
II. Whether the trial Court erred in limiting defense counsel's cross-examination? 
III. Whether the jury erred in finding Mr. Favazzo guilty of DUI? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. The trial court's factual findings underlying the denial of the motion to suppress is 
reviewed for clear error and the conclusions of law for correctness. State v. Riggs. 987 
P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
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II. The trial court's limitation of defense counsel's cross-examination of a witness is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion with reversal required "unless the error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hackford. 737 P.2D 200, 204 (Utah 1987). 
III. The jury's verdict in a criminal case is reviewed for sufficiency of evidence as a 
matter of law to warrant conviction. To affirm the jury's verdict, the court must be sure 
the [City] introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." 
State v. Smith , 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are: 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV : 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance 
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of Counsel for his defense. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 12: which states in pertinent part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14: which states in pertinent part 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated 
Salt Lake City Ordinance § 12.24.100: which states in pertinent part: 
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this Section for any person to operate 
or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this City if the person has a 
blood or breath alcohol content of 0.08 grams or greater by weight as shown by a 
chemical test given within two (2) hours after the alleged operation or physical 
control, or if the person is under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle within the City. The fact that a person charged 
with violating this Section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug 
does not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this Section. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 3, 2002, Salt Lake City Police Officer William Bridge stopped the 
appellant, David Favazzo based on observed conduct wherein Mr. Favazzo was slumped 
over his steering wheel for a period of time and a possible traffic violation. Upon making 
contact with Mr. Favazzo, Officer Bridge noted certain physical characteristics including 
the odor of alcohol about Mr. Favazzofs person. Officer Bridge then called for a 
specialized officer. Officer Roger Nielson a DUI Specialist responded to the scene, 
questioned Mr. Favazzo and asked him to perform certain field sobriety tests. Mr. 
Favazzo failed the tests and refused Officer Nielson's request to submit to a blood test. 
Based on observed physical characteristics, statements by Mr. Favazzo coupled with his 
failure of the field sobriety tests and refusal to submit to a blood test, Mr. Favazzo was 
arrested for Driving Under the Influence and obstructing traffic. 
On May 7,2001, the Honorable William W. Barrett presided over a Motion to 
Suppress hearing. At the conclusion of testimony by Officer Bridge, the only witness 
who testified, the court denied Mr. Favazzofs motion to suppress. The court then 
scheduled the case for a jury trial on August 10, 2001. 
On August 10, 2001, a jury convicted Mr. Favazzo of count I, Driving Under the 
Influence, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.24.100 
and acquitted him of count II, Driving too Slowly. On September 17, 2001, the 
Honorable William W. Barrett sentenced Mr. Favazzo. Mr. Favazzo then filed a Notice 
of Appeal on October 16,2001, and an Amended Notice of Appeal on October 17,2001. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 03, 2002, at approximately 10:50 p.m., Salt Lake City Police Officer 
William Bridge while in his patrol car at the intersection of 500 South and 400 West 
heading northbound observed a light blue Nissan automobile stopped at the light in the 
southbound lane. The driver appeared to slumped over the steering wheel as if 
unconscious, ill or asleep. (R 195). When the light turned green, Officer Bridge 
proceeded north. Upon approaching the 400 South 400 West intersection, Officer Bridge 
observed that the car had not moved and that a car behind it had to go around. Given the 
passage of time, some 10 to 15 seconds, Officer Bridge turned around his patrol car in 
order to investigate if there was a problem and determine if there was a reason for the 
delay which caused the other car to drive around Mr. Favazzofs car. Mr Favazzofs car 
started to move as Officer Bridge approached. 
Officer Bridge initiated an investigatory traffic stop assisted by Salt Lake City 
Police Officer William Silver. Upon making contact, Officer Bridge noticed the driver, 
Mr. Favazzo, the sole occupant of the vehicle had an odor of alcohol about his person. 
When Officer Bridge asked Mr. Favazzo to exit the vehicle, he immediately reached for 
some money and a lighter that was between his legs. (R 197). Officer Bridge then 
handcuffed Mr. Favazzo for officer safety until the arrival of Officer Roger Nielson a 
DUI specialist. (R 198). 
Upon arrival, Officer Neilson approached Mr. Favazzo and explained that he 
would like Mr. Favazzo to perform certain coordination and field sobriety tests in order to 
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determine if he was okay to drive. Officer Neilson noted certain physical characteristics 
such as a strong odor of alcohol from Mr. Favazzo's breath, unsteady balance, slow 
sometimes incoherent speech, red watery eyes, smacking lips and poor short term 
memory. In response to amount he had to drink, MR. Favazzo said f,A little, two or so 
drinks." When asked "What kind of drugs are you taking?" Mr. Favazzo responded: 
"Nothing I am going to tell you about or discuss with you." (R 212 - 215) 
Officer Nielson asked Mr. Favazzo perform certain field sobriety tests such as the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus, the finger count, the hand slap, finger to nose, and a 
preliminary breath test. Mr. Favazzo was asked to perform these particular tests because 
he told Officer Nielson that he had nerve damage in his left leg and had broken his back 
several times. (R 217) Although Mr. Favazzo agreed to perform a preliminary breath test, 
he failed to blow into the instrument as instructed. (R 222-223) Officer Nielson then 
asked Mr. Favazzo to submit to a blood test. Mr. Favazzo refused responding that it was 
improper and that he would not subject himself to any needles. (R 225) Based on his 
refusal and absence of a responsible party, Mr. Favazzo was taken into custody. (R 226) 
During the jury trial, the Honorable William W. Barrett somewhat limited defense 
counsel's cross examination of Officer Roger Nielson. (R241-243, 246) At the 
conclusion of the Appellee's case in chief, Judge Barrett explained his interruption of 
defense counsel's cross-examination. (R 262-264). Mr. Favazzo then testified on his own 
behalf. The jury deliberated and returned verdict of guilty on the DUI offense and not 
guilty on the offense of driving too slowly. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied the defendant's Motion to Suppress based on the 
evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing. Under the totality of the 
circumstances, the trial court found that the stop of the defendant was reasonable and not 
illegal given Officer Bridges'observation and concern. 
The right of cross-examination, although a safeguard essential to a fair trial is not 
without limitation. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in limiting defense 
counsel's cross examination of Officer Roger Nielson, the DUI specialist who responded 
to the scene of the incident. The trial court's efforts to encourage effective cross 
examination was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court did not limit defense 
counsel's ability to pursue certain issues, or infringe on Mr. Favazzo's constitutional right 
of confrontation. The effect of the trial court's limitation was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
This court should uphold the decision of the jury in a light most favorable to the 
jury verdict. The jury, after hearing testimony from the prosecution and the defense 
returned with a verdict of guilty on the count I - DUI and not guilty on Count II- driving 
too slowly. Mr. Favazzo, the appellant bears the burden of proving that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. This Court should affirm the jury's 
verdict of guilty as to the DUI charge, unless this Court finds that appellee, Salt Lake City 
failed introduce sufficient evidence to support all of the elements of the DUI charge. 
ARGUMENT 
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I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
The trial court's findings underlying the denial of Mr. Favazzo's motion to 
suppress should be affirmed. At the motion to suppress hearing Officer Bridge testified 
that he stopped Mr. Favazzo because he thought Mr. Favazzo who was slumped over his 
steering wheel at the intersection, was either impaired, ill or asleep. Officer Bridge 
testified that it is not required that a car start moving as soon as the light turns green. 
Nonetheless, barring mechanical problems it is expected that a car stopped at an 
intersection would move within a fairly reasonable amount of time rather than obstruct 
traffic. In the instant case, Officer Bridge testified that there was a vehicle behind Mr. 
Favazzo which had to go around in order to continue in its intended direction of travel 
southbound. 
This court said: [A] traffic stop is a limited seizure and is more like an 
investigative detention than a custodial arrest." State v. Parker. 834 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). The reasonableness of the investigative traffic stop at 
issue in this case should be governed by the two pronged test set forth in Terry: "(1) Was 
the officer's action justified at the inception?, and (2) Was his action reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place?" Id, 
(citations omitted). 
The answers to both these questions are in the affirmative. The issue is not Mr. 
Favazzo's failure to immediately drive once the light turned green. Officer Bridge 
observed Mr. Favazzo slumped over his steering wheel. Officer Bridge became 
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concerned when Mr. Favazzo's car did not move for some ten seconds and another car 
had to go around him. Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer William Bridge 
acted reasonably in stopping Mr. Favazzo to find out if there was a problem requiring 
assistance or attention. 
Finally, as stated by this court: "Appellate courts review [a] trial court's factual 
findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and the conclusions 
of law for correctness." State v. Swing. 11 P.3d 299 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000). The trial court 
did not err in denying Mr. Favazzo's motion to suppress. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S LIMITATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CROSS 
EXAMINATION OF OFFICER NIELSON WAS HARMLESS. NOT IN 
VIOLATION OF MR. FAVAZZO'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF 
CONFRONTATION. 
The trial court's interruption and limitation of defense counsel's cross-examination 
of Officer Roger Nielson was an effort to encourage effective cross-examination not an 
effort to infringe on Mr. Favazzo's right of confrontation. Appellee agrees that the right 
of confrontation serves several important purposes in a criminal trial. However, in the 
instant case the trial court's limitation did not infringe on Mr. Favazzo's Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation because Mr. Favazzo through counsel was in fact able to cross 
examine Officer Nielson. 
The trial court's limitation was an appropriate exercise of its discretion pursuant to 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The record indicates that the trial court 
encouraged defense counsel to not waste time by merely going over direct testimony but 
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focusing on specific areas of concern. In State v Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 
1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the right of cross-examination is not without 
limitation. The Court further reasoned: "And as we noted in State v. Chestnut. 621 P.2d 
1228 (Utah 1980), the right to cross-examine does not entail the right to harass, annoy, or 
humiliate [the] witness on cross-examination, nor to engage in repetitive questioning." 
(citations omitted). In the instant case, the rationale behind the trials court's limitation 
was to avoid repetitive questioning. 
In United States v. Fuentez. 231 F.3d 700, 704 (10th Cir.2000), the Tenth Circuit 
said: "The complete denial of access to an area properly subject to cross-examination 
infringes on the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, and constitutes reversible error. 
On the other hand, merely limiting the scope of cross-examination is a matter well within 
the trial judge's discretion and such an error "will not lead to reversal unless an abuse of 
discretion, clearly prejudicial to the defendant, is shown." (citations omitted) (see also 
United States v. Polk , 550 F.2d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1977) ("A complete denial of 
access to an area properly subject to cross-examination constitutes reversible error, but 
the extent of cross-examination is discretionary with the trial judge.")). 
The instant case does not involve complete denial of access to an area properly 
subject to cross-examination. Again, trial court exercised its discretion in an effort to 
discourage a mere recitation of the evidence presented on direct. The Supreme Court of 
Utah recently reasoned that: "the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination, not cross examination that is effective in whatever way, and 
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to whatever extent, the defense might wish." State v. Callihan. 484 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 
P31 (Utah 2002) (citations omitted). 
Assuming arguendo that this court finds there was some error in the trial court's 
action. This court must then determine if the error in limiting or restricting cross-
examination was harmless under the constitutional harmless-error standard. In State v 
Hackford. 737 P 2d 200, 205, (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court giving some 
guidance as to relevant factors to be considered said: "Whether an error under that 
standard is harmless depends on a "host of factors," including the importance of the 
witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the 
presence or absence of evidence collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the 
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and of 
course the overall strength of the prosecution's case." 
Upon considering the aforementioned factors as well as the trial court's record, this 
court should find that the trial court's limitation of defense counsel's cross-examination 
was harmless. Although the trial court limited some of defense counsel's cross-
examination, defense counsel was not completely denied access to an area proper for 
cross-examination. 
III. THE JURY VERDICT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED GIVEN THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
The evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict. 
Evidence presented at trial included among other things testimony about Mr. Favazzo's 
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consumption of alcohol and possible consumption of drugs, testimony as to impairment 
based on Mr. Favazzo's performance of the various field sobriety tests, and Mr. Favazzofs 
refusal to submit to a chemical test. 
The jury instructions allowed the jury to consider all of the evidence presented 
prior to reaching a unanimous verdict. For example, jury instruction number 18 stated: 
"If you find that the defendant refused to submit to a chemical test, any inferences which 
may arise from such a refusal may be used together with all other evidence introduced at 
trial to determine what the facts are." In addition to jury instructions about actual 
physical control and the field sobriety tests, jury instruction number 23 stated all of the 
essential elements the jury must consider prior to reaching a verdict on the charge of 
Driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. In the instant case, the jury's guilty 
verdict was based on their finding that the essential elements of DUI had been established 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This court has acknowledged that "On appeal, we recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to the juryfs verdict." State v. BurL 839 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
cert denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Additionally, this court said: "We will reverse 
only if the evidence is so "'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." State 
v. Harman. 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989).(citations omitted). This court's review 
should be "from a perspective most favorable to the verdict the evidence and all 
inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence, recognizing that determinations 
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regarding witness credibility are solely within the jury's province." Id. 
Prior to deliberating and returning a verdict of guilty on the DUI offense, the jury 
heard testimony from both Officer Roger Nielsen and Mr. Favazzo. On direct Officer 
Nielsen testified that he observed several characteristics consistent with someone who 
was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Mr. Favazzo acknowledged having 
consumed alcohol and also stated that he was not going to discuss or tell Officer Nielsen 
about any drugs he had been taking. The field sobriety tests do not without more 
establish an individual's guilt or innocence for he offense of DUI. Office Nielson 
testified that he departed from requesting two of the uniform standardized field sobriety 
tests, the one-legged stand and the 9-step walk and turn because Mr. Favazzo had some 
physical limitation. Mr. Favazzo told Officer Nielson that he had nerve damage in his left 
leg and had broken his back several times. As a result Officer Nielson asked Mr. Favazzo 
to perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the finger count test, a hand slap test, a finger -
to-nose test and a preliminary breath test. With regard to the HGN, Officer Nielsen 
testified that he allowed Mr. Favazzo to stand with his feet a foot and a half apart rather 
than with heel and toes together because Mr. Favazzo said that doing so caused him some 
pain. 
Finally, the trial record indicates that, appellee Salt Lake City presented sufficient 
evidence to the jury who as the exclusive judges of the facts, issues of witness credibility 
and weight found the defendant guilty of driving under the influence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Given the underlying facts and circumstance resulting in Officer Bridge's stopping 
Mr. Favazzo, the trial court did not err in denying Mr. Favazzofs motion to suppress. 
With regard to limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of DUI specialist 
Officer Roger Nielson during the jury trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
Moreover, the trial court's limitation was not an infringement of Mr. Favazzo's 
constitutional right of confrontation as the trial court allowed Mr. Favazzo's counsel to 
cross-examine Officer Nielson on subject areas open and proper for cross-examination. 
Finally, the jury did not render its verdict in a vacuum. The jury returned with a 
verdict after hearing all the evidence and being properly instructed as to the essential 
elements that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, the jury's verdict 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /o^ day of October, 2002. 
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fney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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